Terror and the Economy
A stable economy can give a boost to the fight against terror and Pakistan's resilient business community gives hope
by IKRAM SEHGAL
Terror is stalking the land, nothing can be more symbolic than the Marriot bombing of Sep 20. In the first flush some have compared it to 9/11, maybe not on the scale but certainly in relevance, given that it took place on a special day for Pakistan. Within Islamabad’s high security zone, security measures were at their highest level. The timing (and the route) took into account the grey hour after Iftar. Give the devil his due, and that is not a pun, the penetration was exceedingly well planned. While a determined terrorist will invariably get through, there is certainly a security failure here. This is not meant as an aspersion but as an objective observation. Evaluating the ability and the expertise available and given that our intelligence and law enforcement agencies are trying their best, our best is unfortunately not good enough to deter the crass motivation driving the terrorists. We must accept that our security apparatus is woefully ill-equipped and inadequate to cope with what we are presently facing. We must still cope with possibly more such terrorist attacks against “soft” targets in our major cities. The Marriot was targetted for maximum impact, not only for human and material damage but to deliver terrorism’s special message of murder and mayhem, duly carried live by the international media across the globe. The economy is already under severe pressure because of the gap between our import requirements and foreign currency availability, force-multiplying the constant depreciation of the Pakistan Rupee. This was a major psychological blow to foreign investment. With casualties among expatriates, the Marriot bombing achieved all terrorist objectives, would investors risk sending their representatives to Pakistan? The country is fast becoming a no-go place for sports, well on its way to becoming a no-go place to do business or business with. One of the lessons from the video-footage of the Marriot bombing is that private security guards badly need adequate training to counter terrorism. Diplomats and multi-nationals use private security, an important factor for the economy. Without extensive damage control, expect long-term adverse repercussions to the economy (one must eulogise the stance and fortitude of Sadruddin Hashwani, owner of Marriot Hotel chain in Pakistan, a symbol of courage in dealing with both the human tragedy and material damage, his presence at the devastated site almost around the clock meant he led from the front in coping with the challenge, that he promised to re-build the devastated premises in a short time is symbolic of the resilience of Pakistani business community). Marked success in the war against terrorism is only possible by a change in perception of our internal situation. The Catch-22, success in this war is only possible on the bedrock of a stable economy. President Asif Ali Zardari had a successful meeting with President Bush Jr on Tuesday in New York. In a roundabout way Bush Jr committed the US to respecting Pakistan’s territorial integrity, something his Secretary Defense Robert Gates was not subscribing to in a hearing the same day before a select Senate panel in Washington. While one is not privy to the Zardari wish list, it should have included, viz (1) recognition of Pakistan’s sacrifice in the war against terrorism (2) emergency economic aid to Pakistan to shore up our precarious economic situation, focusing mainly on oil and food security (3) relief for our energy deficiencies by giving us access to nuclear technology and materials (4) necessary helicopters and high-tech equipment for mobility and real-time intelligence to the Pakistan Army (5) barring US ground incursions into Pakistan (6) barring Predator strikes except with absolute Pakistan collaboration with concrete evidence about high-value targets (7) targetting those militants fighting Pakistani forces in FATA, eg Baitullah Mahsud can be taken out in any day if the Americans really want to (8) reining in Indian intelligence operating in Afghanistan from carrying out acts undermining Pakistan’s sovereignty (9) eradicating poppy fields in Afghanistan and eliminating heroin laboratories being run by Karzai’s associates (10) re-organizing US forces under a unified command as recommended by military specialists (11) support Pakistan in making FATA a Free Trade Zone (FTZ), organising a Marshal-type plan by expanding the Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ) concept and (12) helping put able-bodied Afghans in refugee camps into special camps to stop them from crossing the border to reinforce the Talibaan. National Security consists of State security and societal security. State security means protecting territory, thereby integrity and sovereignty of the State and the institutions that guard them. Societal security stands for identity, it incorporates the various freedoms that the citizens enjoy, of belief, speech, association etc and the protection of the infra-structures that support those freedoms, etc. Societal security should take precedence over State security, in Pakistan there has been militarization of society societal because of long periods of Army rule. When the vital organs of the State come under threat, in a democracy (as opposed to military rule) citizens are willing give up some of their freedoms as seen in the enactment of the US Patriot Act by the US Congress. A responsible media balances the loss of those freedoms. In Pakistan, the media seldom exercises that maturity, freedom being more akin to licence. When Pervez Musharraf needed the media most at the fag end of his rule, the media turned on him with a vengeance. Some sections of the media even glorified terrorists, not out of intent of glorification but as a knee-jerk opposition to Musharraf’s rule, with sensationalism meant for more viewer attention. Such licence directly threatens national security. Pakistan must ensure viz (1) all the intelligence agencies are well coordinated by a National Intelligence Board functioning under a full-time National Security Council (NSC), one with a non-political role (2) raising a composite force dedicated to fight terrorism, drawing its officers and men from the Army, police and para-military forces, along with direct recruitment (3) using high-tech methods including CCTV and container scanners on all highways, particularly those heading into major cities (4) educating the media about the adverse effects of glorifying terrorism and terrorists (5) make a concerted drive to get people support across the broad spectrum of stakeholders and (6) ensuring good governance and speedy justice at the grassroots level. There is a desperate need to re-vamp our strategy to tackle the situation, differentiating the Army’s counter-insurgency operations from the war against terrorism, primarily the domain of civilian law enforcement agencies notwithstanding the binding link between the two blurring the difference. Performing far better than previously, the Army has militants on the run, the remedial impact of counter-insurgency training as well as battle experience gained over the years. The war being waged against militants in FATA, Swat and Bajaur must be speeded up. We need to fully exploit the grassroots of local policing, relying on their extensive homegrown network to ferret out potential terrorists. The disconnect between the agencies and the feed available from the local police is an enormous hole in our defences against the bad guys. Success in the war against terrorism will only be possible if our intelligence apparatus is geared to giving “actionable intelligence” to law enforcement agencies. |